Terror is with us now, our insecurity heightened by the inknowns.

"P.M.'s Dossier 2002"  (Iraq);  Dossier, India (Mumbai 2008)



27 July 2010  Last updated at 12:40 ET

Hans Blix: "They should have drawn the conclusion that their sources were poor"

Iraq inquiry: Former UN inspector Blix says war illegal

The UN's former chief weapons inspector Hans Blix has said it is his "firm view" that the Iraq war was illegal.  Dr Blix told the Iraq inquiry the UK had sought to go down the "UN route" to deal with Saddam Hussein but failed.

Ex-Attorney General Lord Goldsmith, who advised the war was lawful on the basis of existing UN resolutions, "wriggled about" in his arguments, he suggested.

Dr Blix said his team of inspectors had visited 500 sites but found no evidence of weapons of mass destruction.

As head of the UN's Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) between 1999 and 2003, Dr Blix was a key figure in the run-up to the March 2003 invasion as he sought to determine the extent of Saddam's weapons programme.

'No smoking gun'

Asked about the inspections he oversaw between November 2002 and 18 March 2003 - when his team was forced to pull out of Iraq on the eve of the war - he said he was "looking for smoking guns" but did not find any.

While his team discovered prohibited items such as missiles beyond the permitted range, missile engines and a stash of undeclared documents, he said these were "fragments" and not "very important" in the bigger picture.

"We carried out about six inspections per day over a long period of time.

"All in all, we carried out about 700 inspections at different 500 sites and, in no case, did we find any weapons of mass destruction."

Although Iraq failed to comply with some of its disarmament obligations, he added it "was very hard for them to declare any weapons when they did not have any".

Legal explanation

He criticised decisions that led to the war, saying existing UN resolutions on Iraq did not contain the authority needed, contrary to the case put by the UK government.

"Eventually they had to come with, I think, a very constrained legal explanation," he said. "You see how Lord Goldsmith wriggled about and how he, himself, very much doubted it was adequate."

Lord Goldsmith has acknowledged his views on the necessity of a further UN resolution mandating military action changed in the months before the invasion and that the concluded military action was justified on the basis of Iraq breaching disarmament obligations dating back to 1991.

But Dr Blix said most international lawyers believed these arguments would not stand up at an international tribunal.

"Some people maintain that Iraq was legal. I am of the firm view that it was an illegal war. There can be cases where it is doubtful, maybe it was permissible to go to war, but Iraq was, in my view, not one of those."

He said he agreed with France and Russia, who argued that further UN authorisation was needed for military action.

"It was clear that a second resolution was required," he said.

In the run-up to war, he said the US government was "high on" the idea of pre-emptive military action as a solution to international crises.

"They thought they could get away with it and therefore it was desirable to do so."

'Judgement questioned'

While he believed Iraq "unilaterally" destroyed its weapons of mass destruction after the 1991 Gulf War, Dr Blix said he never "excluded" the prospect that it had begun to revive some form of chemical and biological capabilities.

At the age of 82, Hans Blix retains considerable stamina.

He came out of retirement a decade ago to lead the ultimately futile search for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

On Tuesday, he gave evidence to the Iraq inquiry for three hours, before heading off to conduct a round of TV interviews.

The inquiry panel wanted to know what this mild-mannered former Swedish diplomat had made of Saddam Hussein's behaviour.

"I never met him", replied Dr Blix, "but I saw him as someone who wanted to be like Emperor Nebuchadnezzar.... utterly ruthless.... and he misjudged it at the end".

Dr Blix trod a neutral path during the build-up to the Iraq conflict, but, in his evidence, he repeated much of what he has said on different occasions since 2003.

Crucially, he had serious doubts about the intelligence that lay behind the move to go to war.

In September 2002, he said he told Tony Blair privately that he believed Iraq "retained" some WMD, noting CIA reports that Iraq may hold some anthrax.

However, he said he began to become suspicious of US intelligence on Iraq following claims in late 2002 that Iraq had purchased raw uranium from Niger, which he always said he thought was flawed.

Since the war, Dr Blix has accused the UK and US of "over-interpreting" intelligence on weapons to bolster the case for war but he said the government's controversial September 2002 dossier on Iraqi weapons seemed "plausible" at the time.

He stressed that Tony Blair never put any "pressure" on him over his search for weapons in Iraq and did not question that the prime minister and President Bush believed in "good faith" that Iraq was a serious threat.

"I certainly felt that he [Tony Blair] was absolutely sincere in his belief.

"What I question was the good judgement, particularly of President Bush but also in Tony Blair's judgement."

Inspection timetable

Critics of the war believe that had inspectors been allowed to continue their work they would have proved beyond doubt that Iraq did not have active weapons of mass destruction capability - as was discovered after the invasion.

Dr Blix said the military momentum towards the invasion - which he said was "almost unstoppable" by early March - did not "permit" more inspections and the UK was a "prisoner on this train".

If he had been able to conduct more inspections, he said he believed they would have begun to "undermine" US-UK intelligence on Iraq's alleged weapons and made the basis for the invasion harder.

The US and UK have always maintained that Saddam Hussein failed to co-operate fully with the inspections process and was continuing to breach UN disarmament resolutions dating back to 1991.

In his evidence in January, former foreign secretary Jack Straw said the regime had only started complying in the final period before the invasion "because a very large military force was at their gates".

The inquiry, headed by Sir John Chilcot, is coming towards the end of its public hearings, with a report expected to be published around the end of the year.
Citing 9/11, Blair Defends Legacy at Iraq Inquiry
NYTIMES
By JOHN F. BURNS and ALAN COWELL
January 30, 2010

LONDON — Almost seven years after he ordered British troops to join the American-led invasion of Iraq, former Prime Minister Tony Blair mounted an unwavering defense of his actions on Friday, saying he would take the same steps again to counter what he depicted as a threat from Saddam Hussein that had assumed far greater dimensions after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

At times spirited and at times prickly, Mr. Blair was speaking at an official inquiry into Britain’s role in the Iraq conflict, reaching for arguments to shape a legacy in the face of criticism that he had led Britain into an unpopular war and misled the nation about his reasons for doing so.

Asked if he had regrets, Mr. Blair said he bore responsibility “but not a regret for removing Saddam Hussein.” And while he said he was sorry about the profound divisions the war caused in Britain, “I genuinely do believe the world is safer as a result.”

Britain was the United States’ most prominent ally in the war, sending more than 40,000 troops to join the force that advanced from Kuwait in March 2003 to topple the government of Mr. Hussein, unleashing years of bloodstained strife in Iraq. Mr. Blair’s support for the United States brought him a hero’s praise in Washington, even as his reputation and credibility at home crumbled, contributing to his ouster in mid-2007 by his onetime friend and rival, Gordon Brown.

The formal inquiry in the Queen Elizabeth II conference center here, close to the Houses of Parliament on the banks of the River Thames, offered him an unusually prominent platform to map out his own version of a history that has brought much vilification in his own land.

In that vein, he described a close relationship with the former American president, George W. Bush, a bond often depicted by Mr. Blair’s adversaries as underpinned by sinister, secret dealings to circumvent hostile opinion both in Britain and at the United Nations.

“This isn’t about a lie or a conspiracy or a deceit or a deception,” Mr. Blair said. “It’s a decision. And the decision I had to take was, given Saddam’s history, given his use of chemical weapons, given the over one million people whose deaths he had caused, given 10 years of breaking U.N. resolutions, could we take the risk of this man reconstituting his weapons program or is that a risk it is responsible to take?”

He went on: “The decision I took — and frankly would take again — was: if there was any possibility that he could develop weapons of mass destruction, we would stop him. It was my view then and that is my view now.”

After six hours of testimony, though, Mr. Blair seemed to have betrayed no new secrets about his handling of the crisis.

Publicly, Mr. Blair has long argued that the invasion’s primary aim was to disarm Mr. Hussein. But after the fall of Baghdad, no unconventional weapons were found to justify his rationale for war, nor was any link established between the Iraqi government and the attackers on Sept. 11. Many British critics also assailed Mr. Blair for what they depicted as his slavish support of Mr. Bush, who, unlike the British leader, has not been called to account publicly for his decisions.

Before the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, Iraq had been under a series of international restrictions designed to contain Mr. Hussein’s ability to threaten neighbors after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. At that time, Mr. Blair said, he thought “Saddam was a menace, that he was a threat, he was a monster, but we would have to try and make the best of it.”

“The crucial thing after Sept. 11 is that the calculus of risk changed,” he said. “The point about this terrorist act was that over 3,000 people had been killed on the streets of New York, and this is what changed my perception of risk: if these people inspired by this religious fanaticism could have killed 30,000, they would have.”

Some of the questioning in six hours of scheduled testimony turned on Mr. Blair’s confidential meetings with Mr. Bush, starting with an encounter at the Bush ranch in Crawford, Tex., in April 2002, where Mr. Blair has been accused by critics of secretly committing Britain to war.

“What I said to George Bush was that we are going to be with you” in countering the perceived threat from Mr. Hussein, he said.

But, Mr. Blair insisted, there was no firm agreement on what specific action — diplomatic, military or economic — would be taken. He told Mr. Bush that “if it came to military action, we would be with” the United States, although, at that time, Britain favored diplomacy through the United Nations.

Calling Mr. Hussein a “probably wicked if not psychopathic man,” Mr. Blair said that if he had been able to pursue a program to develop unconventional weapons, “at some point we were going to be involved in the consequences of that.”

Mr. Blair also defended the legality of the war, saying that if the attorney general, Lord Peter Goldsmith, had not overcome his earlier doubts about the war’s justification in law, “we would never have been able to take action.”

Much of the debate in Britain has focused on the use of intelligence information by the British authorities to bolster their depiction of Mr. Hussein as an international threat.

A contentious British intelligence dossier published in September 2002, for instance, said that Iraq had unconventional weapons that could be used within 45 minutes of an order being given. In a rare admission, Mr. Blair acknowledged Friday that the intelligence was wrong. “It would have been better to have corrected it in the light of the significance it later took on,” he said.

But, he went on, he believed “beyond doubt” that the Iraqi government possessed unconventional weapons and that, as the crisis deepened in 2002 and 2003, the threat was growing.

Mr. Blair arrived two hours early at the hearings and was driven into the buildings by a rear entrance to sidestep several hundred demonstrators, outnumbered by police, who chanted slogans like “Jail Tony” and “Blair Lied — Thousands Died.”

“We haven’t come here expecting an apology,” one protester, Gary Walker, 31, said, “But it’s important to show seven years on that people still care about the illegal war.”

The inquiry, led by Sir John Chilcot, a retired civil servant, follows two earlier, narrowly based investigations of the war, the last completed only 16 months after American and British forces invaded Iraq in March 2003. Those inquiries were widely judged in Britain to have given the Blair government too easy a passage on the war, which many critics here regard as Britain’s worst foreign policy blunder since the Suez invasion in 1956. Britain withdrew the last of its combat forces from Iraq last year.

As the hearings drew towards a close Friday, Mr. Blair was also pressed about why Britain and the United States had not foreseen the continuing chaos and violence that seized Iraq for years after the invasion. He replied that the allies had not expected Iran to behave in the way it did as what he called “a major destabilizing factor.”

On several occasions he referred to the “2010 question” of what the situation would have been without the invasion as a way of justifying his actions.

And, he said, if the United States and Britain had not toppled Mr. Hussein, “we would be facing a situation where Iraq would be competing with Iran on nuclear weapons capability and on the nuclear issue in support of terrorist groups.”

This document has been since questioned for its accuracy - one example here.
DOSSIER 2002 CONTENTS

 Foreword by the Prime Minister
 Executive Summary
 Part One: Iraq's Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programmes

 Chapter 1: The role of intelligence
 Chapter 2: Iraq's programmes 1971-1998
 Chapter 3: The current position 1998-2002
 Part Two: History of UN Weapons Inspections
 Part Three:Iraq under Saddam Hussein
 ----------------


FOREWORD BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE TONY BLAIR MP

 The document published today is based, in large part, on the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee  (JIC). The JIC is at the heart of the British intelligencemachinery.

 It is chaired by the Cabinet Office and made up of the heads of the UK's three Intelligence and Security  Agencies, the Chief of Defence Intelligence, and senior officials from key government departments.

 For over 60 years the JIC has provided regular assessments to successive Prime Ministers and senior  colleagues on a wide range of foreign policy and international security issues.

 Its work, like the material it analyses, is largely secret. It is unprecedented for the Government to  publish this kind of document. But in light of the debate about Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction
 (WMD), I wanted to share with the British public the reasons why I believe this issue to be a current and  serious threat to the UK national interest.

 In recent months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence from inside Iraq that despite  sanctions, despite the damage done to his capability in the past, despite the UN Security Council  Resolutions expressly outlawing it, and despite his denials, Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop  WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real damage upon the region, and the stability of the world.

 Gathering intelligence inside Iraq is not easy. Saddam's is one of the most secretive and dictatorial  regimes in the world.

 So I believe people will understand why the Agencies cannot be specific about the sources, which have  formed the judgements in this document, and why we cannot publish everything we know. We cannot, of
 course, publish the detailed raw intelligence.

 I and other Ministers have been briefed in detail on the intelligence and are satisfied as to its authority. I  also want to pay tribute to our Intelligence and Security Services for the often extraordinary work that
 they do.

 What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to  produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons,
 and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile programme.

 I also believe that, as stated in the document, Saddam will now do his utmost to try to conceal his  weapons from UN inspectors. The picture presented to me by the JIC in recent months has become
 more not less worrying.

 It is clear that, despite sanctions, the policy of containment has not worked sufficiently well to prevent  Saddam from developing these weapons.

 I am in no doubt that the threat is serious and current, that he has made progress on WMD, and that he  has to be stopped. Saddam has used chemical weapons, not only against an enemy state, but against
 his own people.

 Intelligence reports make clear that he sees the building up of his WMD capability, and the belief  overseas that he would use these weapons, as vital to his strategic interests, and in particular his goal of
 regional domination.

 And the document discloses that his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45  minutes of an order to use them. I am quite clear that Saddam will go to extreme lengths, indeed has
 already done so, to hide these weapons and avoid giving them up.

 In today's inter-dependent world, a major regional conflict does not stay confined to the region in  question. Faced with someone who has shown himself capable of using WMD, I believe the international
 community has to stand up for itself and ensure its authority is upheld.

 The threat posed to international peace and security, when WMD are in the hands of a brutal and  aggressive regime like Saddam's, is real. Unless we face up to the threat, not only do we risk  undermining the authority of the UN, whose resolutions he defies, but more importantly and in the  longer term, we place at risk the lives and prosperity of our own people.

 The case I make is that the UN Resolutions demanding he stops his WMD programme are being flouted;  that since the inspectors left four years ago he has continued with this programme; that the inspectors
 must be allowed back in to do their job properly; and that if he refuses, or if he makes it impossible for  them to do their job, as he has done in the past, the international community will have to act.

 I believe that faced with the information available to me, the UK Government has been right to support  the demands that this issue be confronted and dealt with. We must ensure that he does not get to use
 the weapons he has, or get hold of the weapons he wants.
 
 


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 1. Under Saddam Hussein Iraq developed chemical and biological weapons, acquired missiles allowing it  to attack neighbouring countries with these weapons and persistently tried to develop a nuclear bomb.
 Saddam has used chemical weapons, both against Iran and against his own people. Following the Gulf  War, Iraq had to admit to all this. And in the ceasefire of 1991 Saddam agreed unconditionally to give  up his weapons of mass destruction.

 2. Much information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is already in the public domain from UN  reports and from Iraqi defectors. This points clearly to Iraq's continuing possession, after 1991, of  chemical and biological agents and weapons produced before the Gulf War. It shows that Iraq has  refurbished sites formerly associated with the production of chemical and biological agents. And it  indicates that Iraq remains able to manufacture these agents, and to use bombs, shells, artillery rockets  and ballistic missiles to deliver them.

 3. An independent and well-researched overview of this public evidence was provided by the  International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on 9 September. The IISS report also suggested that  Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within months of obtaining fissile material from foreign sources.

 4. As well as the public evidence, however, significant additional information is available to the  Government from secret intelligence sources, described in more detail in this paper. This intelligence  cannot tell us about everything.

 However, it provides a fuller picture of Iraqi plans and capabilities. It shows that Saddam Hussein  attaches great importance to possessing weapons of mass destruction which he regards as the basis for  Iraq's regional power. It shows that he does not regard them only as weapons of last resort. He is ready  to use them, including against his own population, and is determined to retain them, in breach of United  Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR).

 5. Intelligence also shows that Iraq is preparing plans to conceal evidence of these weapons, including  incriminating documents, from renewed inspections. And it confirms that despite sanctions and the policy
 of containment, Saddam has continued to make progress with his illicit weapons programmes.

 6. As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has:   continued to produce chemical and biological agents; military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, including against its own Shia
 population. Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them; command and control arrangements in place to use chemical and biological weapons. Authority  ultimately resides with Saddam Hussein. (There is intelligence that he may have delegated this authority  to his son Qusai); developed mobile laboratories for military use, corroborating earlier reports about the mobile  production of biological warfare agents; pursued illegal programmes to procure controlled materials of potential use in the production of  chemical and biological weapons programmes; tried covertly to acquire technology and materials which could be used in the production of nuclear  weapons; sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no active civil nuclear power  programme that could require it; recalled specialists to work on its nuclear programme; illegally retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles, with a range of 650km, capable of carrying chemical or  biological warheads; started deploying its al-Samoud liquid propellant missile, and has used the absence of weapons  inspectors to work on extending its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed  by the United Nations; started producing the solid-propellant Ababil-100, and is making efforts to extend its range to at least  200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations; constructed a new engine test stand for the development of missiles capable of reaching the UK  Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus and NATO members (Greece and Turkey), as well as all Iraq's Gulf  neighbours and Israel; pursued illegal programmes to procure materials for use in its illegal development of long range  missiles; learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and has already begun to conceal sensitive  equipment and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors.

 7. These judgements reflect the views of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). More details on the  judgements and on the development of the JIC's assessments since 1998 are set out in Part 1 of this
 paper.

 8. Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are in breach of international law. Under a series of UN Security  Council Resolutions Iraq is obliged to destroy its holdings of these weapons under the supervision of UN
 inspectors. Part 2 of the paper sets out the key UN Security Council Resolutions. It also summarises the  history of the UN inspection regime and Iraq's history of deception, intimidation and concealment in its
 dealings with the UN inspectors.

 9. But the threat from Iraq does not depend solely on the capabilities we have described. It arises also  because of the violent and aggressive nature of Saddam Hussein's regime. His record of internal
 repression and external aggression gives rise to unique concerns about the threat he poses.

 The paper briefly outlines in Part 3 Saddam's rise to power, the nature of his regime and his history of  regional aggression. Saddam's human rights abuses are also catalogued, including his record of torture,
 mass arrests and summary executions.

 10. The paper briefly sets out how Iraq is able to finance its weapons programme. Drawing on illicit  earnings generated outside UN control, Iraq generated illegal income of some $3 billion in 2001.
 


PART ONE: IRAQ'S CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMMES

 CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

 1. Since UN inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq in 1998, there has been little overt information on  Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.   Much of the publicly available information about Iraqi capabilities and intentions is dated. But we also  have available a range of secret intelligence about these programmes and Saddam Hussein's intentions.

 This comes principally from the United Kingdom's intelligence and analysis agencies - the Secret  Intelligence Service (SIS), the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the Security  Service, and the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). We also have access to intelligence from close allies.

 2. Intelligence rarely offers a complete account of activities which are designed to remain concealed.  The nature of Saddam's regime makes Iraq a difficult target for the intelligence services.   Intelligence, however, has provided important insights into Iraqi programmes and Iraqi military thinking.   Taken together with what is already known from other sources, this intelligence builds our understanding  of Iraq's capabilities and adds significantly to the analysis already in the public domain.

 But intelligence sources need to be protected, and this limits the detail that can be made available.

 3. Iraq's capabilities have been regularly reviewed by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which has  provided advice to the Prime Minister and his senior colleagues on the developing assessment, drawing
 on all available sources. Part 1 of this paper includes some of the most significant views reached by the  JIC between 1999 and 2002.

 CHAPTER 2 IRAQ'S PROGRAMMES: 1971-1998

 1. Iraq has been involved in chemical and biological warfare research for over 30 years.

 Its chemical warfare research started in 1971 at a small, well guarded site at Rashad to the north east  of Baghdad. Research was conducted there on a number of chemical agents including mustard gas, CS
 and tabun.

 Later, in 1974 a dedicated organisation called al-Hasan Ibn al-Haitham was established. In the late  1970s plans were made to build a large research and commercial-scale production facility in the desert
 some 70km north west of Baghdad under the cover of Project 922.   This was to become Muthanna State Establishment, also known as al-Muthanna, and operated under the  front name of Iraq's State Establishment for Pesticide Production. It became operational in 1982-83.

 It had five research and development sections, each tasked to pursue different programmes.

 In addition, the al-Muthanna site was the main chemical agent production facility, and it also took the  lead in weaponising chemical and biological agents including all aspects of weapon development and
 testing, in association with the military.   According to information, subsequently supplied by the Iraqis, the total production capacity in 1991 was  4,000 tonnes of agent per annum, but we assess it could have been higher.

 Al-Muthanna was supported by three separate storage and precursor production facilities known as  Fallujah 1, 2 and 3 near Habbaniyah, north west of Baghdad, parts of which were not completed before
 they were heavily bombed in the 1991 Gulf War.

 2. Iraq started biological warfare research in the mid-1970s. After small-scale research, a purpose-built  research and development facility was authorised at al-Salman, also known as Salman Pak.   This is surrounded on three sides by the Tigris river and situated some 35km south of Baghdad.

 Although some progress was made in biological weapons research at this early stage, Iraq decided to  concentrate on developing chemical agents and their delivery systems at al-Muthanna. With the
 outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, in the early 1980s, the biological weapons programme was revived.   The appointment of Dr Rihab Taha in 1985, to head a small biological weapons research team at
 al-Muthanna,  helped to develop the programme. At about the same time plans were made to develop the Salman Pak  site into a secure biological warfare research facility.

 Dr Taha continued to work with her team at al-Muthanna until 1987 when it moved to Salman Pak, which  was under the control of the Directorate of General Intelligence.

 Significant resources were provided for the programme, including the construction of a dedicated  production facility (Project 324) at al-Hakam.

 Agent production began in 1988 and weaponisation testing and later filling of munitions was conducted in  association with the staff at Muthanna State Establishment. From mid-1990, other civilian facilities were
 taken over and some adapted for use in the production and research and development of biological  agents.

 These included: al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Vaccine Institute which produced botulinum toxin and conducted virus  research. There is some intelligence to suggest that work was also conducted on anthrax;   al-Fudaliyah Agriculture and Water Research Centre where Iraq admitted it undertook aflatoxin  production and genetic engineering; Amariyah Sera and Vaccine Institute which was used for the storage of biological agent seed stocks  and was involved in genetic engineering.

 3. By the time of the Gulf War Iraq was producing very large quantities of chemical and biological  agents. From a series of Iraqi declarations to the UN during the 1990s we know that by 1991 they had
 produced at least:  ,000 litres of botulinum toxin, 8,500 litres of anthrax, 2,200 litres of aflatoxin and were working on a  number of other agents; 2,850 tonnes of mustard gas, 210 tonnes of tabun, 795 tonnes of sarin and cyclosarin, and 3.9 tonnes  of VX.

 4. Iraq's nuclear programme was established under the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission in the 1950s.   Under a nuclear co-operation agreement signed with the Soviet Union in 1959, a nuclear research
 centre, equipped with a research reactor, was built at Tuwaitha, the main Iraqi nuclear research centre.   The research reactor worked up to 1991.

 The surge in Iraqi oil revenues in the early 1970s supported an expansion of the research programme.   This was bolstered in the mid-1970s by the acquisition of two research reactors powered by highly
 enriched uranium fuel and equipment for fuel fabrication and handling. By the end of 1984 Iraq was  self-sufficient in uranium ore.   One of the reactors was destroyed in an Israeli air attack in June 1981 shortly before it was to become  operational; the other was never completed.

 5. By the mid-1980s the deterioration of Iraq's position in the war with Iran prompted renewed interest  in the military use of nuclear technology.   Additional resources were put into developing technologies to enrich uranium as fissile material  (material that makes up the core of a nuclear weapon) for use in nuclear weapons. Enriched uranium  was preferred because it could be more easily produced covertly than the alternative, plutonium. Iraq  followed parallel programmes to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU), electromagnetic isotope  separation (EMIS) and gas centrifuge enrichment.

 By 1991 one EMIS enrichment facility was nearing completion and another was under construction.   However, Iraq never succeeded in its EMIS technology and the programme had been dropped by 1991.   Iraq decided to concentrate on gas centrifuges as the means for producing the necessary fissile  material. Centrifuge facilities were also under construction, but the centrifuge design was still being
 developed.

 In August 1990 Iraq instigated a crash programme to develop a single nuclear weapon within a year.  This programme envisaged the rapid development of a small 50 machine gas centrifuge cascade to
 produce weapons-grade HEU using fuel from the Soviet research reactor, which was already  substantially enriched, and unused fuel from the reactor bombed by the Israelis.   By the time of the Gulf War, the crash programme had made little progress.

 6. Iraq's declared aim was to produce a missile warhead with a 20-kiloton yield and weapons designs  were produced for the simplest implosion weapons. These were similar to the device used at Nagasaki in
 1945. Iraq was also working on more advanced concepts.   By 1991 the programme was supported by a large body of Iraqi nuclear expertise, programme  documentation and databases and manufacturing infrastructure.

 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iraq had: experimented with high explosives to produce implosive shock waves; invested significant effort to understand the various options for neutron initiators; made significant progress in developing capabilities for the production, casting and machining of  uranium metal.

 7. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had a well-developed ballistic missile industry.

 Many of the missiles fired in the Gulf War were an Iraqi modified version of the SCUD missile, the  al-Hussein, with an extended range of 650km. Iraq had about 250 imported SCUD-type missiles prior to
 the Gulf War plus an unknown number of indigenously produced engines and components.   Iraq was working on other stretched SCUD variants, such as the al-Abbas, which had a range of 900km.   Iraq was also seeking to reverse-engineer the SCUD engine with a view to producing new missiles.

 Recent intelligence indicates that they may have succeeded at that time. In particular, Iraq had plans for  a new SCUD-derived missile with a range of 1200km. Iraq also conducted a partial flight test of a  multistage satellite launch vehicle based on SCUD technology, known as the al-Abid.

 Also during this period, Iraq was developing the Badr-2000, a 700-1000km range two-stage solid  propellant missile (based on the Iraqi part of the 1980s CONDOR-2 programme run in co-operation with
 Argentina and Egypt). There were plans for 1200-1500km range solid propellant follow-on systems.

 The use of chemical and biological weapons

 8. Iraq had made frequent use of a variety of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. Many of the  casualties are still in Iranian hospitals suffering from the long-term effects of numerous types of cancer  and lung diseases. In 1988 Saddam also used mustard and nerve agents against Iraqi Kurds at Halabja  in northern Iraq (see box on p15). Estimates vary, but according to Human Rights Watch up to 5,000  people were killed.

 9. Iraq used significant quantities of mustard, tabun and sarin during the war with Iran resulting in over  20,000 Iranian casualties.

 A month after the attack on Halabja, Iraqi troops used over 100 tonnes of sarin against Iranian troops  on the al-Fao peninsula. Over the next three months Iraqi troops used sarin and other nerve agents on
 Iranian troops causing extensive casualties.

 10. From Iraqi declarations to the UN after the Gulf War we know that by 1991 Iraq had produced a  variety of delivery means for chemical and biological agents including over 16,000 free-fall bombs and
 over 110,000 artillery rockets and shells.   Iraq also admitted to the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) that it had 50 chemical and 25 biological
 warheads available for its ballistic missiles.

 The use of ballistic missiles

 11. Iraq fired over 500 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq War at both civilian and military  targets, and 93 SCUD-type missiles during the Gulf War. The latter were targeted at Israel and Coalition
 forces stationed in the Gulf region.

 12. At the end of the Gulf War the international community was determined that Iraq's arsenal of  chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles should be dismantled.   The method chosen to achieve this was the establishment of UNSCOM to carry out intrusive inspections  within Iraq and to eliminate its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with a range of  over 150km.

 The IAEA was charged with the abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. Between 1991 and 1998  UNSCOM succeeded in identifying and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons and ballistic
 missiles as well as associated production facilities.

 The IAEA also destroyed the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and removed key  nuclear materials.

 This was achieved despite a continuous and sophisticated programme of harassment, obstruction,  deception and denial (see Part 2). Because of this UNSCOM concluded by 1998 that it was unable to fulfil  its mandate. The inspectors were withdrawn in December 1998.

 13. Based on the UNSCOM report to the UN Security Council in January 1999 and earlier UNSCOM  reports, we assess that when the UN inspectors left Iraq they were unable to account for:  up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent; up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, including approximately 300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi  chemical warfare programme, were unique to the production of VX; growth media procured for biological agent production (enough to produce over three times the 8,500  litres of anthrax spores Iraq admits to having manufactured); over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents.

 14. The departure of UNSCOM meant that the international community was unable to establish the truth  behind these large discrepancies and greatly diminished its ability to monitor and assess Iraq's  continuing attempts to reconstitute its programmes.


CHAPTER 3

 THE CURRENT POSITION: 1998-2002

 1. This chapter sets out what we know of Saddam Hussein's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic  missile programmes, drawing on all the available evidence.

 While it takes account of the results from UN inspections and other publicly available information, it also  draws heavily on the latest intelligence about Iraqi efforts to develop their programmes and capabilities
 since 1998.

 The main conclusions are that: Iraq has a useable chemical and biological weapons capability, in breach of UNSCR 687, which has  included recent production of chemical and biological agents; Saddam continues to attach great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction and  ballistic missiles which he regards as being the basis for Iraq's regional power. He is determined to  retain these capabilities; Iraq can deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive range of artillery shells, free-fall  bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles; Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons, in breach of its obligations under the  Non-Proliferation Treaty and in breach of UNSCR 687. Uranium has been sought from Africa that has no  civil nuclear application in Iraq; Iraq possesses extended-range versions of the SCUD ballistic missile in breach of UNSCR 687 which  are capable of reaching Cyprus, Eastern Turkey, Tehran and Israel. It is also developing longer-range  ballistic missiles; Iraq's current military planning specifically envisages the use of chemical and biological weapons; Iraq's military forces are able to use chemical and biological weapons, with command, control and  logistical arrangements in place. The Iraqi military are able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes  of a decision to do so; Iraq has learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and is already taking steps to conceal  and disperse sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors; Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missiles programmes are well-funded.

 CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment: 1999-2002

 2. Since the withdrawal of the inspectors the JIC has monitored evidence, including from secret  intelligence, of continuing work on Iraqi offensive chemical and biological warfare capabilities.

 In the first half of 2000 the JIC noted intelligence on Iraqi attempts to procure dual-use chemicals and  on the reconstruction of civil chemical production at sites formerly associated with the chemical warfare
 programme.

 Iraq had also been trying to procure dual-use materials and equipment which could be used for a  biological warfare programme.

 Personnel known to have been connected to the biological warfare programme up to the Gulf War had  been conducting research into pathogens.

 There was intelligence that Iraq was starting to produce biological warfare agents in mobile production  facilities. Planning for the project had begun in 1995 under Dr Rihab Taha, known to have been a central
 player in the pre-Gulf War programme.

 The JIC concluded that Iraq had sufficient expertise, equipment and material to produce biological  warfare agents within weeks using its legitimate bio-technology facilities.

 3. In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq retained some chemical warfare agents, precursors,  production equipment and weapons from before the Gulf War.   These stocks would enable Iraq to produce significant quantities of mustard gas within weeks and of  nerve agent within months.

 The JIC concluded that intelligence on Iraqi former chemical and biological warfare facilities, their  limited reconstruction and civil production pointed to a continuing research and development programme.   These chemical and biological capabilities represented the most immediate threat from Iraqi weapons of  mass destruction.

 Since 1998 Iraqi development of mass destruction weaponry had been helped by the absence of  inspectors and the increase in illegal border trade, which was providing hard currency.

 4. In the last six months the JIC has confirmed its earlier judgements on Iraqi chemical and biological  warfare capabilities and assessed that Iraq has the means to deliver chemical and biological weapons.

 Recent intelligence

 5. Subsequently, intelligence has become available from reliable sources which complements and adds  to previous intelligence and confirms the JIC assessment that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons.
 The intelligence also shows that the Iraqi leadership has been discussing a number of issues related to  these weapons. This intelligence covers: Confirmation that chemical and biological weapons play an important role in Iraqi military thinking:  intelligence shows that Saddam attaches great importance to the possession of chemical and biological  weapons which he regards as being the basis for Iraqi regional power. He believes that respect for Iraq  rests on its possession of these weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them.

 Intelligence indicates that Saddam is determined to retain this capability and recognises that Iraqi  political weight would be diminished if Iraq's military power rested solely on its conventional military
 forces. Iraqi attempts to retain its existing banned weapons systems: Iraq is already taking steps to prevent  UN weapons inspectors finding evidence of its chemical and biological weapons programme.

 Intelligence indicates that Saddam has learnt lessons from previous weapons inspections, has identified  possible weak points in the inspections process and knows how to exploit them. Sensitive equipment and
 papers can easily be concealed and in some cases this is already happening.

 The possession of mobile biological agent production facilities will also aid concealment

 Saddam is determined not to lose the capabilities that he has been able to develop further in the four  years since inspectors left.  Saddam's willingness to use chemical and biological weapons: intelligence indicates that as part of  Iraq's military planning Saddam is willing to use chemical and biological weapons, including against his  own Shia population.

 Intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45  minutes of an order to do so.

 Chemical and biological agents: surviving stocks

 6. When confronted with questions about the unaccounted stocks, Iraq has claimed repeatedly that if it  had retained any chemical agents from before the Gulf War they would have deteriorated sufficiently to
 render them harmless.

 But Iraq has admitted to UNSCOM to having the knowledge and capability to add stabiliser to nerve  agent and other chemical warfare agents which would prevent such decomposition.

 In 1997 UNSCOM also examined some munitions which had been filled with mustard gas prior to 1991  and found that they remained very toxic and showed little sign of deterioration.

 7. Iraq has claimed that all its biological agents and weapons have been destroyed. No convincing proof  of any kind has been produced to support this claim.

 In particular, Iraq could not explain large discrepancies between the amount of growth media (nutrients  required for the specialised growth of agent) it procured before 1991 and the amounts of agent it admits
 to having manufactured. The discrepancy is enough to produce more than three times the amount of  anthrax allegedly manufactured.

 Chemical agent: production capabilities

 8. Intelligence shows that Iraq has continued to produce chemical agent. During the Gulf War a number  of facilities which intelligence reporting indicated were directly or indirectly associated with Iraq's  chemical weapons effort were attacked and damaged.

 Following the ceasefire UNSCOM destroyed or rendered harmless facilities and equipment used in Iraq's  chemical weapons programme.

 Other equipment was released for civilian use either in industry or academic institutes, where it was  tagged and regularly inspected and monitored, or else placed under camera monitoring, to ensure that it  was not being misused. This monitoring ceased when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq in 1998.

 However, capabilities remain and, although the main chemical weapon production facility at al-Muthanna  was completely destroyed by UNSCOM and has not been rebuilt, other plants formerly associated with  the chemical warfare programme have been rebuilt. These include the chlorine and phenol plant at  Fallujah 2 near Habbaniyah.

 In addition to their civilian uses, chlorine and phenol are used for precursor chemicals which contribute  to the production of chemical agents.

 9. Other dual-use facilities, which are capable of being used to support the production of chemical agent  and precursors, have been rebuilt and re-equipped.

 New chemical facilities have been built, some with illegal foreign assistance, and are probably fully  operational or ready for production. These include the Ibn Sina Company at Tarmiyah (see figure 1),  which is a chemical research centre.   It undertakes research, development and production of chemicals previously imported but not now  available and which are needed for Iraq's civil industry.

 The Director General of the research centre is Hikmat Na'im al-Jalu who prior to the Gulf War worked in  Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and after the war was responsible for preserving Iraq's chemical
 expertise.

 10. Parts of the al-Qa'qa' chemical complex damaged in the Gulf War have also been repaired and are  operational.   Of particular concern are elements of the phosgene production plant at al-Qa'qa'.

 These were severely damaged during the Gulf War, and dismantled under UNSCOM supervision, but  have since been rebuilt. While phosgene does have industrial uses it can also be used by itself as a  chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agent.

 11. Iraq has retained the expertise for chemical warfare research, agent production and weaponisation.   Most of the personnel previously involved in the programme remain in country.

 While UNSCOM found a number of technical manuals (so called "cook books") for the production of  chemical agents and critical precursors, Iraq's claim to have unilaterally destroyed the bulk of the
 documentation cannot be confirmed and is almost certainly untrue.

 Recent intelligence indicates that Iraq is still discussing methods of concealing such documentation in  order to ensure that it is not discovered by any future UN inspections.

 Biological agent: production capabilities

 12. We know from intelligence that Iraq has continued to produce biological warfare agents.

 As with some chemical equipment, UNSCOM only destroyed equipment that could be directly linked to  biological weapons production.

 Iraq also has its own engineering capability to design and construct biological agent associated  fermenters, centrifuges, sprayer dryers and other equipment and is judged to be self-sufficient in the  technology required to produce biological weapons.

 The Problem of Dual-Use Facilities Almost all components and supplies used in weapons of mass  destruction and ballistic missile programmes are dual-use.

 For example, any major petrochemical or biotech industry, as well as public health organisations, will  have legitimate need for most materials and equipment required to manufacture chemical and biological  weapons.   Without UN weapons inspectors it is very difficult therefore to be sure about the true nature of many of
 Iraq's facilities.

 For example, Iraq has built a large new chemical complex, Project Baiji, in the desert in north west Iraq at al-Sharqat (see figure 2). This site is a former uranium enrichment facility which was damaged during
 the Gulf War and rendered harmless under supervision of the IAEA.

 Part of the site has been rebuilt, with work starting in 1992, as a chemical production complex.

 Despite the site being far away from populated areas it is surrounded by a high wall with watch towers  and guarded by armed guards. Intelligence reports indicate that it will produce nitric acid which can be  used in explosives, missile fuel and in the purification of uranium.

13. UNSCOM established that Iraq considered the use of mobile biological agent production facilities. In  the past two years evidence from defectors has indicated the existence of such facilities. Recent  intelligence confirms that the Iraqi military have developed mobile facilities.   These would help Iraq conceal and protect biological agent production from military attack or UN  inspection.

 Chemical and biological agents: delivery means

 14. Iraq has a variety of delivery means available for both chemical and biological agents. These  include: free-fall bombs: Iraq acknowledged to UNSCOM the deployment to two sites of free-fall bombs filled
 with biological agent during 1990-91.

 These bombs were filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq also acknowledged possession  of four types of aerial bomb with various chemical agent fills including sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin and
 cyclosarin; artillery shells and rockets: Iraq made extensive use of artillery munitions filled with chemical agents  during the Iran-Iraq War. Mortars can also be used for chemical agent delivery. Iraq is known to have
 tested the use of shells and rockets filled with biological agents. Over 20,000 artillery munitions remain  unaccounted for by UNSCOM; helicopter and aircraft borne sprayers: Iraq carried out studies into aerosol n of biological agent using  these platforms prior to 1991. UNSCOM was unable to account for many of these devices. It is probable  that Iraq retains a capability for aerosol dispersal of both chemical and biological agent over a large  area; al-Hussein ballistic missiles (range 650km): Iraq told UNSCOM that it filled warheads with anthrax,  botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq also developed chemical agent warheads for al-Hussein.

 Iraq admitted to producing 50 chemical warheads for al-Hussein which were intended for the delivery of  a mixture of sarin and cyclosarin.

 However, technical analysis of warhead remnants has shown traces of VX degradation product which  indicate that some additional warheads were made and filled with VX; al-Samoud/Ababil-100 ballistic missiles (range 150km plus): it is unclear if chemical and biological  warheads have been developed for these systems, but given the Iraqi experience on other missile  systems, we judge that Iraq has the technical expertise for doing so; L-29 remotely piloted vehicle programme. We know from intelligence that Iraq has attempted to  modify the L-29 jet trainer to allow it to be used as an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) which is  potentially capable of delivering chemical and biological agents over a large area.

 Chemical and biological warfare: command and control

 15. The authority to use chemical and biological weapons ultimately resides with Saddam but intelligence  indicates that he may have also delegated this authority to his son Qusai. Special Security Organisation
 (SSO) and Special Republican Guard (SRG) units would be involved in the movement of any chemical  and biological weapons to military units.

 The Iraqi military holds artillery and missile systems at Corps level throughout the Armed Forces and  conducts regular training with them.

 The Directorate of Rocket Forces has operational control of strategic missile systems and some Multiple  Launcher Rocket Systems.

 Chemical and biological weapons: summary

 16. Intelligence shows that Iraq has covert chemical and biological weapons programmes, in breach of  UN Security Council Resolution 687 and has continued to produce chemical and biological agents. Iraq
 has: chemical and biological agents and weapons available, both from pre-Gulf War stocks and more recent  production; the capability to produce the chemical agents mustard gas, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX capable of  producing mass casualties; a biological agent production capability and can produce at least anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin  and ricin. Iraq has also developed mobile facilities to produce biological agents; a variety of delivery means available; military forces, which maintain the capability to use these weapons with command, control and  logistical arrangements in place.

 NUCLEAR WEAPONS

 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessments: 1999-2001

 17. Since 1999 the JIC has monitored Iraq's attempts to reconstitute its nuclear weapons programme.  In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq had continued its nuclear research after 1998.

 The JIC drew attention to intelligence that Iraq had recalled its nuclear scientists to the programme in  1998. Since 1998 Iraq hadbeen trying to procure items that could be for use in the construction of  centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium.

 Iraqi nuclear weapons expertise

 18. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Chapter 2 describe the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme prior to the Gulf  War. It is clear from IAEA inspections and Iraq's own declarations that by 1991 considerable progress  had been made in both developing methods to produce fissile material and in weapons design.

 The IAEA dismantled the physical infrastructure of the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme, including the  dedicated facilities and equipment for uranium separation and enrichment, and for weapon development  and production, and removed the remaining highly enriched uranium.

 But Iraq retained, and retains, many of its experienced nuclear scientists and technicians who are  specialised in the production of fissile material and weapons design.   Intelligence indicates that Iraq also retains the accompanying programme documentation and data.

 19. Intelligence shows that the present Iraqi programme is almost certainly seeking an indigenous  ability to enrich uranium to the level needed for a nuclear weapon.   It indicates that the approach is based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, one of the routes Iraq  was following for producing fissile material before the Gulf War.

 But Iraq needs certain key equipment, including gas centrifuge components and components for the  production of fissile material before a nuclear bomb could be developed.


 20. Following the departure of weapons inspectors in 1998 there has been an accumulation of  intelligence indicating that Iraq is making concerted covert efforts to acquire dual-use technology and  materials with nuclear applications. Iraq's known holdings of processed uranium are under IAEA  supervision. But there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium  from Africa. Iraq has no active civil nuclear power programme or nuclear power plants and therefore  has no legitimate reason to acquire uranium.

 21. Intelligence shows that other important procurement activity since 1998 has included attempts to  purchase: vacuum pumps which could be used to create and maintain pressures in a gas centrifuge cascade
 needed to enrich uranium; an entire magnet production line of the correct specification for use in the motors and top bearings of  gas centrifuges. It appears that Iraq is attempting to acquire a capability to produce them on its own  rather than rely on foreign procurement; Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride (AHF) and fluorine gas. AHF is commonly used in the petrochemical  industry and Iraq frequently imports significant amounts, but it is also used in the process of converting  uranium into uranium hexafluoride for use in gas centrifuge cascades; one large filament winding machine which could be used to manufacture carbon fibre gas centrifuge  rotors; a large balancing machine which could be used in initial centrifuge balancing work.

 22. Iraq has also made repeated attempts covertly to acquire a very large quantity (60,000 or more) of  specialised aluminium tubes.

 The specialised aluminium in question is subject to international export controls because of its potential  application in the construction of gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium, although there is no definitive
 intelligence that it is destined for a nuclear programme.

 Nuclear weapons: timelines

 23. In early 2002, the JIC assessed that UN sanctions on Iraq were hindering the import of crucial goods  for the production of fissile material.   The JIC judged that while sanctions remain effective Iraq would not be able to produce a nuclear  weapon.

 If they were removed or prove ineffective, it would take Iraq at least five years to produce sufficient  fissile material for a weapon indigenously.   However, we know that Iraq retains expertise and design data relating to nuclear weapons.

 We therefore judge that if Iraq obtained fissile material and other essential components from foreign  sources the timeline for production of a nuclear weapon would be shortened and Iraq could produce a  nuclear weapon in between one and two years.

 BALLISTIC MISSILES

 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment: 1999-2002

 24. In mid-2001 the JIC drew attention to what it described as a "step-change" in progress on the Iraqi  missile programme over the previous two years.   It was clear from intelligence that the range of Iraqi missiles which was permitted by the UN and  supposedly limited to 150kms was being extended and that work was under way on larger engines for  longer-range missiles.

 25. In early 2002 the JIC concluded that Iraq had begun to develop missiles with a range of over  1,000kms.   The JIC assessed that if sanctions remained effective the Iraqis would not be able to produce such a
 missile before 2007.

 Sanctions and the earlier work of the inspectors had caused significant problems for Iraqi missile  development. In the previous six months Iraqi foreign procurement efforts for the missile programme  had been bolder.   The JIC also assessed that Iraq retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles from before the Gulf War.

 The Iraqi ballistic missile programme since 1998

 26. Since the Gulf War, Iraq has been openly developing two short-range missiles up to a range of  150km, which are permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687.   The al-Samoud liquid propellant missile has been extensively tested and is being deployed to military  units.

 Intelligence indicates that at least 50 have been produced. Intelligence also indicates that Iraq has  worked on extending its range to at least 200km in breach of UN Security Resolution 687.

 Production of the solid propellant Ababil-100 (Figure 4) is also underway, probably as an unguided  rocket at this stage. There are also plans to extend its range to at least 200km.   Compared to liquid propellant missiles, those powered by solid propellant offer greater ease of storage,  handling and mobility.   They are also quicker to take into and out of action and can stay at a high state of readiness for longer
 periods.

 27. According to intelligence, Iraq has retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles (Figure 5), in breach of UN  Security Council Resolution 687. These missiles were either hidden from the UN as complete systems, or
 re-assembled using illegally retained engines and other components.

 We judge that the engineering expertise available would allow these missiles to be maintained  effectively, although the fact that at least some require re-assembly makes it difficult to judge exactly  how many could be available for use.   They could be used with conventional, chemical or biological warheads and, with a range of up to  650km, are capable of reaching a number of countries in the region including Cyprus, Turkey, Saudi  Arabia, Iran and Israel.

 28. Intelligence has confirmed that Iraq wants to extend the range of its missile systems to over  1000km, enabling it to threaten other regional neighbours.   This work began in 1998, although efforts to regenerate the long-range ballistic missile programme  probably began in 1995.

 Iraq's missile programmes employ hundreds of people. Satellite imagery (Figure 6) has shown a new  engine test stand being constructed (A), which is larger than the current one used for al- Samoud (B),  and that formerly used for testing SCUD engines (C) which was dismantled under UNSCOM supervision.   This new stand will be capable of testing engines for medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with  ranges over 1000km, which are not permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687.

 Such a facility would not be needed for systems that fall within the UN permitted range of 150km.   The Iraqis have recently taken measures to conceal activities at this site. Iraq is also working to obtain
 improved guidance technology to increase missile accuracy.

 29. The success of UN restrictions means the development of new longer-range missiles is likely to be a  slow process.

 These restrictions impact particularly on the:
  availability of foreign expertise;
  conduct of test flights to ranges above 150km;
  acquisition of guidance and control technology.

 30. Saddam remains committed to developing longer-range missiles.

 Even if sanctions remain effective, Iraq might achieve a missile capability of over 1000km within 5 years
 (Figure 7 shows the range of Iraq's various missiles).

 31. Iraq has managed to rebuild much of the missile production infrastructure destroyed in the Gulf War
 and in Operation Desert Fox in 1998 (see Part 2).

 New missile-related infrastructure is also under construction. Some aspects of this, including rocket  propellant mixing and casting facilities at the al-Mamoun Plant, appear to replicate those linked to the
 prohibited Badr-2000 programme (with a planned range of 700-1000km) which were destroyed in the  Gulf War or dismantled by UNSCOM.

 A new plant at al-Mamoun for indigenously producing ammonium perchlorate, which is a key ingredient  in the production of solid propellant rocket motors, has also been constructed.

 This has been provided illicitly by NEC Engineers Private Limited, an Indian chemical engineering firm  with extensive links in Iraq, including to other suspect facilities such as the Fallujah 2 chlorine plant.

 After an extensive investigation, the Indian authorities have recently suspended its export licence,  although other individuals and companies are still illicitly procuring for Iraq.

 32. Despite a UN embargo, Iraq has also made concerted efforts to acquire additional production  technology, including machine tools and raw materials, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution
 1051.   The embargo has succeeded in blocking many of these attempts, such as requests to buy magnesium  powder and ammonium chloride.   But we know from intelligence that some items have found their way to the Iraqi ballistic missile  programme.

 More will inevitably continue to do so. Intelligence makes it clear that Iraqi procurement agents and  front companies in third countries are seeking illicitly to acquire propellant chemicals for Iraq's ballistic  missiles.

 This includes production level quantities of near complete sets of solid propellant rocket motor  ingredients such as aluminium powder, ammonium perchlorate and hydroxyl terminated polybutadiene.

 There have also been attempts to acquire large quantities of liquid propellant chemicals such as  Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and diethylenetriamene. We judge these are intended to  support production and deployment of the al-Samoud and development of longer-range systems.

 33. The UN has sought to restrict Iraq's ability to generate funds for its chemical, biological and other  military programmes.   For example, Iraq earns money legally under the UN Oil For Food Programme (OFF) established by  UNSCR 986, whereby the proceeds of oil sold through the UN are used to buy humanitarian supplies for  Iraq.   This money remains under UN control and cannot be used for military procurement.

 However, the Iraqi regime continues to generate income outside UN control either in the form of hard  currency or barter goods (which in turn means existing Iraqi funds are freed up to be spent on other
 things).

 34. These illicit earnings go to the Iraqi regime. They are used for building new palaces, as well as  purchasing luxury goods and other civilian goods outside the OFF programme.

 Some of these funds are also used by Saddam Hussein to maintain his armed forces, and to develop or  acquire military equipment, including for chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

 We do not know what proportion of these funds is used in this way.

 But we have seen no evidence that Iraqi attempts to develop its weapons of mass destruction and its  ballistic missile programme, for example through covert procurement of equipment from abroad, has
 been inhibited in any way by lack of funds.

 The steady increase over the last three years in the availability of funds will enable Saddam to progress  the programmes faster.

 UN Sanctions

 UN sanctions on Iraq prohibit all imports to and exports from Iraq. The UN must clear any goods  entering or leaving.   The UN also administers the Oil for Food (OFF) programme.

 Any imports entering Iraq under the OFF programme are checked against the Goods Review List for  potential military or weapons of mass destruction utility.

 34. These illicit earnings go to the Iraqi regime. They are used for building new palaces, as well as  purchasing luxury goods and other civilian goods outside the OFF programme. Some of these funds are  also used by Saddam Hussein to maintain his armed forces, and to develop or acquire military  equipment, including for chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.   We do not know what proportion of these funds is used in this way. But we have seen no evidence that  Iraqi attempts to develop its weapons of mass destruction and its ballistic missile programme, for  example through covert procurement of equipment from abroad, has been inhibited in any way by lack of funds.

 The steady increase over the last three years in the availability of funds will enable Saddam to progress  the programmes faster.
 
 


PART TWO: HISTORY OF UN WEAPONS INSPECTIONS

 1. During the 1990s, beginning in April 1991 immediately after the end of the Gulf War, the UN Security  Council passed a series of resolutions [see box] establishing the authority of UNSCOM and the IAEA to  carry out the work of dismantling Iraq's arsenal of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons  programmes and long-range ballistic missiles.

 UN Security Council Resolutions relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction

UNSCR 687, April 1991 created the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and required Iraq to accept,  unconditionally, "the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision" of its  chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km, and their  associated programmes, stocks, components, research and facilities. The International Atomic Energy  Agency (IAEA) was charged with abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. UNSCOM and the IAEA  must report that their mission has been achieved before the Security Council can end sanctions. They  have not yet done so.

UNSCR 707, August 1991, stated that Iraq must provide full, final and complete disclosure of all its  programmes for weapons of mass destruction and provide unconditional and unrestricted access to UN  inspectors.

 For over a decade Iraq has been in breach of this resolution. Iraq must also cease all nuclear activities  of any kind other than civil use of isotopes.

UNSCR 715, October 1991 approved plans prepared by UNSCOM and IAEA for the ongoing monitoring  and verification (OMV) arrangements to implement UNSCR 687. Iraq did not accede to this until  November 1993. OMV was conducted from April 1995 to 15 December 1998, when the UN left Iraq. UNSCR 1051, March 1996 stated that Iraq must declare the shipment of dual-use goods which could be  used for mass destruction weaponry programmes. These resolutions were passed under Chapter VII of  the UN Charter which is the instrument that allows the UN Security Council to authorise the use of  military force to enforce its resolutions.

2. As outlined in UNSCR 687, Iraq's chemical, biological and  nuclear weapons programmes were also a breach of Iraq's commitments under: The 1925 Geneva Protocol which bans the use of chemical and biological weapons; the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which bans the development, production, stockpiling,  acquisition or retention of biological weapons; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which prohibits Iraq from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring  nuclear weapons.

 3. UNSCR 687 obliged Iraq to provide declarations on all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction  programmes within 15 days and accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under  international supervision of its chemical, biological and nuclear programmes, and all ballistic missiles  with a range beyond 150km.

 Iraq did not make a satisfactory declaration within the specified time-frame. Iraq accepted the UNSCRs  and agreed to co-operate with UNSCOM.   The history of the UN weapons inspections was characterised by persistent Iraqi obstruction.

 Iraqi Non-Co-operation with the Inspectors

 4. The former Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, reported to the UN Security Council in January  1999 that in 1991 a decision was taken by a highlevel Iraqi Government committee to provide  inspectors with only a portion of its proscribed weapons, components, production capabilities and stocks.  UNSCOM concluded that Iraqi policy was based on the following actions: to provide only a portion of extant weapons stocks, releasing for destruction only those that were least  modern; to retain the production capability and documentation necessary to revive programmes when possible; to conceal the full extent of its chemical weapons programme, including the VX nerve agent project; to  conceal the number and type of chemical and biological warheads for proscribed long-range missiles; and to conceal the existence of its biological weapons programme.

 5. In December 1997 Richard Butler reported to the UN Security Council that Iraq had created a new  category of sites, "Presidential" and "sovereign", from which it claimed that UNSCOM inspectors would
 henceforth be barred.

 The terms of the ceasefire in 1991 foresaw no such limitation. However, Iraq consistently refused to  allow UNSCOM inspectors access to any of these eight Presidential sites.

 Many of these so-called "palaces" are in fact large compounds which are an integral part of Iraqi  counter-measures designed to hide weapons material (see photograph on p35). UNSCOM and the IAEA  were given the remit to designate any locations for inspection at any time, review any document and  interview any scientist, technician or other individual and seize any prohibited items for destruction.

 Iraq's policy of deception

 Iraq has admitted to UNSCOM to having a large, effective, system for hiding proscribed material  including documentation, components, production equipment and possibly biological and chemical agents  and weapons from the UN.

 Shortly after the adoption of UNSCR 687 in April 1991, an Administrative Security Committee (ASC) was  formed with responsibility for advising Saddam on the information which could be released to UNSCOM
 and the IAEA.

 The Committee consisted of senior Military Industrial Commission (MIC) scientists from all of Iraq's  weapons of mass destruction programmes.

 The Higher Security Committee (HSC) of the Presidential Office was in overall command of deception  operations.

 The system was directed from the very highest political levels within the Presidential Office and  involved, if not Saddam himself, his youngest son, Qusai.

 The system for hiding proscribed material relies on high mobility and good command and control.

 It uses lorries to move items at short notice and most hide sites appear to be located close to good road  links and telecommunications.   The Baghdad area was particularly favoured.

 In addition to active measures to hide material from the UN, Iraq has attempted to monitor, delay and  collect intelligence on UN operations to aid its overall deception plan.

 Intimidation

 6. Once inspectors had arrived in Iraq, it quickly became apparent that the Iraqis would resort to a  range of measures (including physical threats and psychological intimidation of inspectors) to prevent  UNSCOM and the IAEA from fulfilling their mandate.

 7. In response to such incidents, the President of the Security Council issued frequent statements calling  on Iraq to comply with its disarmament and monitoring obligations.

 Obstruction

 8. Iraq denied that it had pursued a biological weapons programme until July 1995.

 In July 1995, Iraq acknowledged that biological agents had been produced on an industrial scale at  al-Hakam. Following the defection in August 1995 of Hussein Kamil, Saddam's son-in-law and former  Director of the Military Industrialisation Commission, Iraq released over two million documents relating  to its mass destruction weaponry programmes and acknowledged that it had pursued a biological  programme that led to the deployment of actual weapons.

 Iraq admitted producing 183 biological weapons with a reserve of agent to fill considerably more.

 9. Iraq tried to obstruct UNSCOM's efforts to investigate the scale of its biological weapons programme.

 It created forged documents to account for bacterial growth media, imported in the late 1980s,  specifically for the production of anthrax, botulinum toxin and probably plague.

 The documents were created to indicate that the material had been imported by the State Company for  Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing for use in hospitals and distribution to local authorities.

 Iraq also censored documents and scientific papers provided to the first UN inspection team, removing  all references to key individuals, weapons and industrial production of agents.

 Iraqi obstruction of UN weapons inspection teams

  keeping IAEA inspectors in a car park for 4 days and refusing to allow them to leave with incriminating  documents on Iraq's nuclear weapons programme (September 1991); announcing that UN monitoring and verification plans were "unlawful" (October 1991); refusing UNSCOM inspectors access to the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture. Threats were made to  inspectors who remained on watch outside the building. The inspection team had reliable evidence that  the site contained archives related to proscribed activities; in 1991-2 Iraq objected to UNSCOM using its own helicopters and choosing its own flight plans. In  January 1993 it refused to allow UNSCOM the use of its own aircraft to fly into Iraq; refusing to allow UNSCOM to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two key missile sites  (June-July 1993); repeatedly denying access to inspection teams (1991- December 1998); interfering with UNSCOM's helicopter operations, threatening the safety of the aircraft and their crews  (June 1997); demanding the end of U2 overflights and the withdrawal of US UNSCOM staff (October 1997); destroying documentary evidence of programmes for weapons of mass destruction (September 1997).

 Inspection of Iraq's biological weapons programme

 In the course of the first biological weapons inspection in August 1991, Iraq claimed that it had merely  conducted a military biological research programme.

 At the site visited, al-Salman, Iraq had removed equipment, documents and even entire buildings.

 Later in the year, during a visit to the al-Hakam site, Iraq declared to UNSCOM inspectors that the  facility was used as a factory to produce proteins derived from yeast to feed animals.

 Inspectors subsequently discovered that the plant was a central site for the production of anthrax spores  and botulinum toxin for weapons. The factory had also been sanitised by Iraqi officials to deceive
 inspectors.

 Iraq continued to develop the al-Hakam site into the 1990s, misleading UNSCOM about its true purpose.

 Another key site, the Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute at al-Dawrah which produced botulinum  toxin and probably anthrax was not divulged as part of the programme.

 Five years later, after intense pressure, Iraq acknowledged that tens of tonnes of bacteriological warfare  agent had been produced there and at al-Hakam.

 As documents recovered in August 1995 were assessed, it became apparent that the full disclosure  required by the UN was far from complete.

 Successive inspection teams went to Iraq to try to gain greater understanding of the programme and to  obtain credible supporting evidence. In July 1996 Iraq refused to discuss its past programme and  doctrine forcing the team to withdraw in protest. Monitoring teams were at the same time finding  undisclosed equipment and materials associated with the past programme.

 In response, Iraq grudgingly provided successive disclosures of its programme which were judged by  UNSCOM and specially convened international panels to be technically inadequate.

 In late 1995 Iraq acknowledged weapons testing the biological agent ricin, but did not provide  production information. Two years later, in early 1997, UNSCOM discovered evidence that Iraq had  produced ricin.

 10. Iraq has yet to provide any documents concerning production of agent and subsequent  weaponisation. Iraq destroyed, unilaterally and illegally, some biological weapons in 1991 and 1992  making accounting for these weapons impossible.

 In addition, Iraq cleansed a key site at al-Muthanna, its main research and development, production and  weaponisation facility for chemical warfare agents, of all evidence of a biological programme in the  toxicology department, the animal-house and weapons filling station.

 11. Iraq refused to elaborate further on the programme during inspections in 1997 and 1998, confining  discussion to previous topics. In July 1998 Tariq Aziz personally intervened in the inspection process
 stating that the biological programme was more secret and more closed than other mass destruction  weaponry programmes.   He also played down the significance of the programme. Iraq has presented the biological weapons  programme as the personal undertaking of a few misguided scientists.

 12. At the same time, Iraq tried to maintain its nuclear weapons programme via a concerted campaign  to deceive IAEA inspectors.

 In 1997 the IAEA Director General stated that the IAEA was "severely hampered by Iraq's persistence in  a policy of concealment and understatement of the programme's scope".

 Inspection achievements

 13. Despite the conduct of the Iraqi authorities towards them, both UNSCOM and the IAEA Action Team  have valuable records of achievement in discovering and exposing Iraq's biological weapons  programme and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons stocks and missiles as well as the  infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme.

 14. Despite UNSCOM's efforts, following the effective ejection of UN inspectors in December 1998 there  remained a series of significant unresolved disarmament issues. In summarising the situation in a report
 to the UN Security Council, the UNSCOM Chairman, Richard Butler, indicated that: contrary to the requirement that destruction be conducted under international supervision "Iraq  undertook extensive, unilateral and secret destruction of large quantities of proscribed weapons and  items"; and Iraq "also pursued a practice of concealment of proscribed items, including weapons, and a cover  up of its activities in contravention of Council resolutions".

 Overall, Richard Butler declared that obstructive Iraqi activity had had "a significant impact upon the  Commission's disarmament work".

 Withdrawal of the inspectors

 15. By the end of 1998 UNSCOM was in direct confrontation with the Iraqi Government which was  refusing to co-operate.

 The US and the UK had made clear that anything short of full co-operation would make military action  unavoidable.

 Richard Butler was requested to report to the UN Security Council in December 1998 and stated that,  following a series of direct confrontations, coupled with the systematic refusal by Iraq to co-operate,  UNSCOM was no longer able to perform its disarmament mandate.

 As a direct result on 16 December the weapons inspectors were withdrawn. Operation Desert Fox was  launched by the US and the UK a few hours afterwards.

 Operation Desert Fox (16-19 December 1998)

 Operation Desert Fox targeted industrial facilities related to Iraq's ballistic missile programme and a  suspect biological warfare facility as well as military airfields and sites used by Iraq's security  organisations which are involved in its weapons of mass destruction programmes.

 Key facilities associated with Saddam Hussein's ballistic missile programme were significantly degraded.

 UNSCOM and IAEA achievements

 UNSCOM surveyed 1015 sites in Iraq, carrying out 272 separate inspections. Despite Iraqi obstruction  and intimidation, UN inspectors uncovered details of chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile
 programmes. Major UNSCOM/IAEA achievements included: the destruction of 40,000 munitions for chemical weapons, 2,610 tonnes of chemical precursors and  411 tonnes of chemical warfare agent; the dismantling of Iraq's prime chemical weapons development and production complex at  al-Muthanna and a range of key production equipment; the destruction of 48 SCUD-type missiles, 11 mobile launchers and 56 sites, 30 warheads filled with  chemical agents, and 20 conventional warheads; the destruction of the al-Hakam biological weapons facility and a range of production equipment, seed  stocks and growth media for biological weapons; the discovery in 1991 of samples of indigenously-produced highly enriched uranium, forcing Iraq's  acknowledgement of uranium enrichment programmes and attempts to preserve key components of its  prohibited nuclear weapons programme; the removal and destruction of the infrastructure for the nuclear weapons programme, including the  al-Athir weaponisation/testing facility.

 The situation since 1998

 16. There have been no UN-mandated weapons inspections in Iraq since 1998. In an effort to enforce  Iraqi compliance with its disarmament and monitoring obligations, the UN Security Council passed  Resolution 1284 in December 1999.

 This established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) as a  successor organisation to UNSCOM and called on Iraq to give UNMOVIC inspectors "immediate,  unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of  transport". It also set out the steps Iraq needed to take in return for the eventual suspension and lifting
 of sanctions.

 A key measure of Iraqi compliance would be full co-operation with UN inspectors, including  unconditional, immediate and unrestricted access to any and all sites, personnel and documents.

 17. For the past three years, Iraq has allowed the IAEA to carry out an annual inspection of a stockpile  of nuclear material (depleted natural and low-enriched uranium). This has led some countries and  western commentators to conclude erroneously that Iraq is meeting its nuclear disarmament and  monitoring obligations.

 As the IAEA has pointed out in recent weeks, this annual inspection does "not serve as a substitute for  the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council".

 18. Dr Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, and Dr Mohammed El- Baradei, the Director  General of the IAEA, have declared that in the absence of inspections it is impossible to verify Iraqi  compliance with its UN disarmament and monitoring obligations.

 In April 1999 an independent UN panel of experts noted that "the longer inspection and monitoring  activities remain suspended, the more difficult the comprehensive implementation of Security Council  resolutions becomes, increasing the risk that Iraq might reconstitute its proscribed weapons  programmes".

 19. The departure of the inspectors greatly diminished the ability of the international community to  monitor and assess Iraq's continuing attempts to reconstitute its chemical, biological, nuclear and  ballistic missile programmes.
 
 


PART THREE: IRAQ UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN

 Introduction

 1. The Republic of Iraq is bounded by Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudia Arabia, Jordan, Syria and the  Persian Gulf. Its population of around 23 million is ethnically and religiously diverse.

 Approximately 77% are Arabs. Sunni Muslims form around 17% of the Arab population and dominate  the government. About 60% of Iraqis are Shias and 20% are Kurds. The remaining 3% of the population  consists of Assyrians, Turkomans, Armenians, Christians and Yazidis.

 2. Public life in Iraq is nominally dominated by the Ba'ath Party (see box on p44).

 But all real authority rests with Saddam and his immediate circle. Saddam's family, tribe and a small  number of associates remain his most loyal supporters.   He uses them to convey his orders, including to members of the government.

 3. Saddam uses patronage and violence to motivate his supporters and to control or eliminate  opposition.

 Potential rewards include social status, money and better access to goods. Saddam's extensive security apparatus and Ba'ath Party network provides oversight of Iraqi society, with informants in social,  government and military organisations.

 Saddam practises torture, execution and other forms of coercion against his enemies, real or suspected.  His targets are not only those who have offended him, but also their families, friends or colleagues.

 4. Saddam acts to ensure that there are no other centres of power in Iraq.

 He has crushed parties and ethnic groups, such as the communists and the Kurds, which might try to  assert themselves. Members of the opposition abroad have been the targets of assassination attempts
 conducted by Iraqi security services.

 5. Army officers are an important part of the Iraqi government's network of informers. Suspicion that  officers have ambitions other than the service of the President leads to immediate execution.   It is routine for Saddam to take preemptive action against those who he believes might conspire against  him.

 Saddam Hussein's rise to power

 Saddam Hussein was born in 1937 in the Tikrit district, north of Baghdad. In 1957 he joined the Ba'ath  Party.

 After taking part in a failed attempt to assassinate the Iraqi President, Abdul Karim Qasim, Saddam  escaped, first to Syria and then to Egypt. In his absence he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.

 Saddam returned to Baghdad in 1963 when the Ba'ath Party came to power. He went into hiding after  the Ba'ath fell from power later that year.

 He was captured and imprisoned, but in 1967 escaped and took over responsibility for Ba'ath security.  Saddam set about imposing his will on the Party and establishing himself at the centre of power.

 The Ba'ath Party returned to power in 1968. In 1969 Saddam became Vice- Chairman of the  Revolutionary Command Council, Deputy to the President, and Deputy Secretary General of the  Regional Command of the Ba'ath.

 In 1970 he joined the Party's National Command and in 1977 was elected Assistant Secretary General.   In July 1979, he took over the Presidency of Iraq. Within days, five fellow members of the Revolutionary
 Command Council were accused of involvement in a coup attempt.   They and 17 others were summarily executed.

 Saddam Hussein's security apparatus

 Saddam relies on a long list of security organisations with overlapping responsibilities. The main ones  are:  The Special Security Organisation oversees Saddam's security and monitors the loyalty of other
 security services. Its recruits are predominantly from Tikrit.  The Special Republican Guard is equipped with the best available military equipment. Its members are  selected on the basis of loyalty to the regime.

The Directorate of General Security is primarily responsible for countering threats from the civilian  population.  The Directorate of General Intelligence monitors and suppresses dissident activities at home and
 abroad. ?œ The Directorate of Military Intelligence's role includes the investigation of military  personnel.  The Saddam Fidayeen, under the control of Saddam's son Udayy, has been used to deal with civil
 disturbances.

 The Iraqi Ba'ath Party

 The Ba'ath Party is the only legal political party in Iraq. It pervades all aspects of Iraqi life. Membership,  around 700,000, is necessary for self-advancement and confers benefits from the regime.

 Internal Repression - the Kurds and the Shias

 6. Saddam has pursued a long-term programme of persecution of the Iraqi Kurds, including through the  use of chemical weapons. During the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam appointed his cousin, Ali Hasan al-Majid, as
 his deputy in the north. In 1987-88, al-Majid led the "Anfal" campaign of attacks on Kurdish villages.   Amnesty International estimates that more than 100,000 Kurds were killed or disappeared during this
 period.

 7. After the Gulf War in 1991 Kurds in the north of Iraq rose up against Baghdad's rule. In response the  Iraqi regime killed or imprisoned thousands, prompting a humanitarian crisis. Over a million Kurds fled  into the mountains and tried to escape Iraq.

 8. Persecution of Iraq's Kurds continues, although the protection provided by the northern No-Fly Zone  has helped to curb the worst excesses. But outside this zone the Baghdad regime has continued a policy  of persecution and intimidation.

 9. The regime has used chemical weapons against the Kurds, most notably in an attack on the town of  Halabja in 1988 (see Part 1 Chapter 2 paragraph 9).   The implicit threat of the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and others is an important part of  Saddam's attempt to keep the civilian population under control.

 10. The regime has tried to displace the traditional Kurdish and Turkoman populations of the areas  under its control, primarily in order to weaken Kurdish claims to the oil-rich area around the northern  city of Kirkuk. Kurds and other non-Arabs are forcibly ejected to the three northern Iraqi governorates,  Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniyah, which are under de facto Kurdish control.

 According to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) Special Rapporteur for Iraq,  94,000 individuals have been expelled since 1991.

 Agricultural land owned by Kurds has been confiscated and redistributed to Iraqi Arabs. Arabs from  southern Iraq have been offered incentives to move into the Kirkuk area.

 11. After the 1979 revolution that ousted the Shah in Iran, Saddam intensified a campaign against the  Shia Muslim majority of Iraq, fearing that they might be encouraged by the new Shia regime in Iran.

 12. On 1 March 1991, in the wake of the Gulf War, riots broke out in the southern city of Basra,  spreading quickly to other cities in Shia-dominated southern Iraq. The regime responded by killing  thousands. Many Shia tried to escape to Iran and Saudi Arabia.

 13. Some of the Shia hostile to the regime sought refuge in the marshland of southern Iraq.   In order to subjugate the area, Saddam embarked on a large-scale programme to drain the marshes to  allow Iraqi ground forces to eliminate all opposition there.

 The rural population of the area fled or were forced to move to southern cities or across the border into  Iran.

 Saddam Hussein's Wars

 14. As well as ensuring his absolute control inside Iraq, Saddam has tried to make Iraq the dominant  power of the region. In pursuit of these objectives he has led Iraq into two wars of aggression against  neighbours, the Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait.

 15. With the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979, relations between Iran and Iraq deteriorated sharply. In  September 1980 Saddam renounced a border treaty he had agreed with Iran in 1975 ceding half of the  Shatt al-Arab waterway to Iran.

 Shortly thereafter, Saddam launched a large-scale invasion of Iran. He believed that he could take  advantage of the state of weakness, isolation and disorganisation he perceived in post-revolutionary  Iran.

 He aimed to seize territory, including that ceded to Iran a few years earlier, and to assert Iraq's position  as a leader of the Arab world. Saddam expected it to be a short, sharp campaign.

 But the conflict lasted for eight years. Iraq fired over 500 ballistic missiles at Iranian targets, including  major cities.

 16. It is estimated that the Iran-Iraq war cost the two sides a million casualties. Iraq used chemical  weapons extensively from 1984. Some twenty thousand Iranians were killed by mustard gas and the  nerve agents tabun and sarin, all of which Iraq still possesses.

 The UN Security Council considered the report prepared by a team of three specialists appointed by the  UN Secretary General in March 1986, following which the President made a statement condemning Iraqi
 use of chemical weapons. This marked the first time a country had been named for violating the 1925  Geneva Convention banning the use of chemical weapons.

 17. The cost of the war ran into hundreds of billions of dollars for both sides. Iraq gained nothing. After  the war ended, Saddam resumed his previous pursuit of primacy in the Gulf. His policies involved  spending huge sums of money on new military equipment. But Iraq was burdened by debt incurred  during the war and the price of oil, Iraq's only major export, was low.

 18. By 1990 Iraq's financial problems were severe. Saddam looked at ways to press the oil-producing  states of the Gulf to force up the price of crude oil by limiting production and waive the $40 billion that  they had loaned Iraq during its war with Iran. Kuwait had made some concessions over production  ceilings.   But Saddam blamed Kuwait for over-production. When his threats and blandishments failed, Iraq  invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. He believed that occupying Kuwait could prove profitable.

 19. Saddam also sought to justify the conquest of Kuwait on other grounds. Like other Iraqi leaders  before him, he claimed that, as Kuwait's rulers had come under the jurisdiction of the governors of
 Basra in the time of the Ottoman Empire, Kuwait should belong to Iraq.

 20. During its occupation of Kuwait, Iraq denied access to the Red Cross, which has a mandate to  provide protection and assistance to civilians affected by international armed conflict. The death penalty
 was imposed for relatively minor "crimes" such as looting and hoarding food.

 21. In an attempt to deter military action to expel it from Kuwait, the Iraqi regime took hostage several  hundred foreign nationals (including children) in Iraq and Kuwait and prevented thousands more from  leaving, in direct contravention of international humanitarian law. Hostages were held as human shields  at a number of strategic military and civilian sites.

 22. At the end of the Gulf War, the Iraqi army fleeing Kuwait set fire to over 1,160 Kuwaiti oil wells with  serious environmental consequences.

 23. More than 600 Kuwaiti and other prisoners of war and missing persons are still unaccounted for. Iraq  refuses to comply with its UN obligation to account for the missing. It has provided sufficient information  to close only three case-files.

 Abuse of human rights

 24. This section draws on reports of human rights abuses from authoritative international organisations,  including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

 25. Human rights abuses continue within Iraq. People continue to be arrested and detained on suspicion  of political or religious activities or often because they are related to members of the opposition.  Executions are carried out without due process of law. Relatives are often prevented from burying the  victims in accordance with Islamic practice.

 Thousands of prisoners have been executed.

 26. Saddam has issued a series of decrees establishing severe penalties for criminal offences. These  include amputation, branding, cutting off ears, and other forms of mutilation. Anyone found guilty of  slandering the President has their tongue removed.

 Human rights: abuses under Saddam Hussein

  4000 prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib Prison in 1984. 3000 prisoners were executed at the Mahjar Prison between 1993 and 1998.  About 2500 prisoners were executed between 1997 and 1999 in a "prison cleansing" campaign.

122 male prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib prison in February/ March 2000. A further 23 political  prisoners were executed there in October 2001. In October 2000 dozens of women accused of prostitution were beheaded without any judicial process.  Some were accused for political reasons. Women prisoners at Mahjar are routinely raped by their guards. Methods of torture used in Iraqi jails include using electric drills to mutilate hands, pulling out  fingernails, knife cuts, sexual attacks and 'official rape'. Prisoners at the Qurtiyya Prison in Baghdad and elsewhere are kept in metal boxes the size of tea  chests. If they do not confess they are left to die.

 Saddam Hussein's family

 27. Saddam's son Udayy maintained a private torture chamber known as the Red Room in a building on  the banks of the Tigris disguised as an electricity installation.

 He created a militia in 1994 which has used swords to execute victims outside their own homes. He has  personally executed dissidents, for instance in the Shia uprising at Basra which followed the Gulf War.

 28. Members of Saddam's family are also subject to persecution. A cousin of Saddam, Ala Abd al-Qadir  al-Majid, fled to Jordan from Iraq citing disagreements with the regime over business matters.

 He returned to Iraq after the Iraqi Ambassador in Jordan declared publicly that his life was not in  danger. He was met at the border by Tahir Habbush, Head of the Directorate of General Intelligence  (the Mukhabarat), and taken to a farm owned by Ali Hasan al-Majid. At the farm Ala was tied to a tree  and executed by members of his immediate family who, following orders from Saddam, took it in turns  to shoot him

 29. Some 40 of Saddam's relatives, including women and children, have been killed. His sons-in-law  Hussein and Saddam Kamil had defected in 1995 and returned to Iraq from Jordan after the Iraqi  government had announced amnesties for them. They were executed in February 1996.

 Human Rights - mistreatment in Abu Ghraib Prison

 Abdallah, a member of the Ba'ath Party whose loyalty became suspect was imprisoned for four years at  Abu Ghraib in the 1980s. On the second day of his imprisonment, the men were forced to walk between  two rows of five guards each to receive their containers of food.

 While walking to get the food, they were beaten by the guards with plastic telephone cables. They had to  return to their cells the same way, so that a walk to get breakfast resulted in twenty lashes.

 According to Abdallah, "It wasn't that bad going to get the food, but coming back the food was spilled  when we were beaten." The same procedure was used when the men went to the bathroom.

 On the third day, the torture continued. "We were removed from our cells and beaten with plastic pipes.  This surprised us, because we were asked no question. Possibly it was being done to break our morale",
 Abdallah speculated.

 The torture escalated to sixteen sessions daily. The treatment was organised and systematic. Abdallah  was held alone in a 3x2-meter room that opened onto a corridor.

 "We were allowed to go to the toilet three times a day, then they reduced the toilet to once a day for  only one minute. I went for four years without a shower or a wash".

 Abdallah said. He also learned to cope with the deprivation and the hunger that accompanied his  detention:

 "I taught myself to drink a minimum amount of water because there was no placed to urinate. They  used wooden sticks to beat us and sometimes the sticks would break. I found a piece of a stick, covered  with blood, and managed to bring it back to my room. I ate it for three days. A person who is hungry  can eat anything. Pieces of our bodies started falling off from the beatings and our skin was so dry that  it began to fall off. I ate pieces of my own body. "No one, not Pushkin, not Mahfouz, can describe what  happened to us.

 It is impossible to describe what living this day to day was like. I was totally naked the entire time. Half  of the original groups [of about thirty men] died. It was a slow type of continuous physical and  psychological torture. Sometimes, it seemed that orders came to kill one of us, and he would be beaten  to death".  (Source: Human Rights Watch)

 Human Rights - individual testimony

 "…I saw a friend of mine, al-Shaikh Nasser Taresh al-Sa'idi, naked. He was handcuffed and a piece of  wood was placed between his elbows and his knees.

 "Two ends of the wood were placed on two high chairs and al-Shaikh Nasser was being suspended like a  chicken.

 "This method of torture is known as al-Khaygania (a reference to a former security director known as  al-Khaygani).

 "An electric wire was attached to al-Shaikh Nasser's penis and another one attached to one of his toes.  He was asked if he could identify me and he said "this is al-Shaikh Yahya".

 "They took me to another room and then after about 10 minutes they stripped me of my clothes and a  security officer said "the person you saw has confessed against you". He said to me "You followers of
 [Ayatollah] al-Sadr have carried out acts harmful to the security of the country and have been  distributing anti-government statements coming from abroad".

 "He asked if I have any contact with an Iraqi religious scholar based in Iran who has been signing these  statements.

 "I said "I do not have any contacts with him"… I was then left suspended in the same manner as  al-Shaikh al-Sa'idi. My face was looking upward. "They attached an electric wire on my penis and the
 other end of the wire is attached to an electric motor.

 "One security man was hitting my feet with a cable. Electric shocks were applied every few minutes and  were increased. I must have been suspended for more than an hour. I lost consciousness. They took
 me to another room and made me walk even though my feet were swollen from beating… They  repeated this method a few times."  (Source: Amnesty International, testimony from an Iraqi theology student from Saddam City)

 Human Rights -individual testimony

 In December 1996, a Kurdish businessman from Baghdad was arrested outside his house by  plainclothes security men. Initially his family did not know his whereabouts and went from one police  station to another inquiring about him.

 Then they found out that he was being held in the headquarters of the General Security Directorate in  Baghdad. The family was not allowed to visit him.

 Eleven months later the family was told by the authorities that he had been executed and that they  should go and collect his body. His body bore evident signs of torture. His eyes were gouged out and the  empty eye sockets filled with paper. His right wrist and left leg were broken.

 The family was not given any reason for his arrest and subsequent execution. However, they suspected  that he was executed because of his friendship with a retired army general who had links with the Iraqi
 opposition outside the country and who was arrested just before his arrest and also executed.  (Source: Amnesty International)



Dossier From India Gives New Details of Mumbai Attacks
NYTIMES
By SOMINI SENGUPTA
January 7, 2009

NEW DELHI — In the beginning, they were 32. A squad of suicide bombers raised in Pakistan, they were taught how to make bombs, withstand interrogation, and fight to their death.

They were whittled down to 10, and on a Saturday morning in November, they set sail from Karachi with coordinates plotted on a global positioning set. Once in Mumbai, they went on a killing spree, leaving 163 dead, all the while receiving detailed instructions and pep talks from their handlers across the border. Details of their gory mission have been compiled by Indian authorities and officially shared Monday with the Pakistani government. The New York Times has seen a copy of the dossier.

The information seems designed to achieve at least two Indian objectives. First, it seeks to demonstrate that the attackers were sent from Pakistan. It contains photographs of materials found on the fishing trawler, from a bottle of Mountain Dew soda packaged in Karachi to pistols that bore the markings of a gun manufacturer in Peshawar to a Pakistani-made matchbox, detergent powder, and shaving cream, called “Touchme.”

Second, it seeks to rally international support for the Indian effort to squeeze Pakistan. It contains a list of 26 foreigners killed in the attacks, chronicles India’s efforts in recent years to persuade Pakistan to investigate suspects involved in terror attacks inside India and shut down terror training camps inside Pakistani territory. In its final pages, it demands that Pakistan hand over “conspirators” to face trial in India and comply with its promise to stop terrorist groups from functioning inside its territory. It was shared this week with diplomats from friendly nations; one described it as “comprehensive,” another as “convincing.”

Although the dossier takes pains not to blame serving or former officials in Pakistan’s army or spy agency, Indian officials have consistently hinted at their complicity, at least in training the commando-style fighters who carried it out. On Tuesday, the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, upped the ante but stopped short of making a direct accusation. “There is enough evidence to show that, given the sophistication and military precision of the attack, it must have had the support of some official agencies in Pakistan,” he said.

Pakistan on Tuesday rejected the Indian allegation. “Scoring points like this will only move us further away from focusing on the very real and present danger of regional and global terrorism,” Sherry Rehman, Pakistan’s Information Minister, said in a statement, according to the Associated Press. “It is our fond resolve to insure that non-state actors to do not use Pakistan’s soil to launch terrorist attack any where in the world.”

Pakistan has said it is examining the information dispatched by India.

The dossier, along with a power-point presentation made to diplomats here, narrates a journey of zeal, foibles and careful planning, one whose blow-by-blow media coverage was followed by handlers, believed to be in Pakistan, and used in turn to caution the gunmen on the ground about the movement of Indian security forces and motivate them to keep fighting.

“Everything is being recorded by the media. Inflict the maximum damage. Keep fighting. Don’t be taken alive,” says a caller to a gunman inside the Oberoi Hotel close to 4 a.m. on the first day of the three-day siege.

“Throw one of two grenades at the Navy and police teams, which are outside,” came one instruction to the gunmen inside the Taj Mahal hotel.

“Keep two magazines and three grenades aside and expend the rest of your ammunition,” went another set of instructions to the attackers inside Nariman House, which housed an Orthodox Jewish center, on the second evening, with a directive to “conclude” the operation the next morning.

The telephone conversations, selected transcripts of which have been compiled in the dossier, chronicle a steady exchange between the attackers in Mumbai and their counselors.

At the Taj, they are asked whether they have set the hotel on fire; one of the attackers says he is preparing a mattress for that purpose. At the Oberoi, one of them asks whether to spare women (“kill them,” comes the terse reply) and Muslims (he is told to release them and kill the rest, all the while keeping the phone line open so their interlocutors can hear the gunfire). At Nariman House, a residential building which housed a Jewish community center, they are told how to damage India’s standing with a key ally, Israel.

“Keep in mind that the hostages are of use only as long as you do not come under fire because of their safety,” a handler, identified only as Wassi, exhorts. “If you are still threatened, then don’t saddle yourself with the burden of the hostages. Immediately kill them.”

“Yes, we shall do accordingly,” the gunman inside Nariman House replies. “God willing.”

“If the hostages are killed, it will spoil relations between India and Israel,” Wassi continues.

According to the investigation, the 10 men boarded a small boat in Karachi at 8 a.m. on Nov. 22, sailed a short distance before boarding a bigger carrier called the Al-Husseini, believed to be owned by Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, a key operative of a banned Pakistan-based terrorist group called Lashkar-e-Taiba. The following day, the 10 men took over an Indian fishing trawler, called the MV Kuber, killed four of its crew members, spared its captain, Amar Singh Solanki, and sailed 550 nautical miles across the Arabian Sea.

Each man had two-hour watch duties on board. Each carried individual weapon packs: a Kalashnikov, a 9-millimeter pistol, ammunition, hand grenades and a bomb, weighing 8 kilograms and containing a military-grade explosive called RDX, steel ball bearings and a timer with instructions inscribed in Urdu.

By 4 p.m. on Nov. 26, the trawler approached the shores of Mumbai. The leader of the crew, identified by Indian investigators as Ismail Khan, 25, from a town called Dera Ismail Khan in the Northwest Frontier Province, contacted their handlers and received instructions. When darkness set in, they killed the captain of the trawler, Mr. Solanki. Then they boarded a motorized dinghy, the engine of which, Indian investigators say, bore marks from a Lahore-based importing company. They reached Mumbai at about 8:30 p.m., and in five teams of two, set upon their targets: the city’s busiest railway station known as Victoria Terminus, a tourist haunt called Café Leopold, the Jewish center in Nariman House, and two luxury hotels, the Taj and Oberoi.

They made one mistake. As they were leaving the fishing trawler, they told their handlers later on the phone, the waves were high and another boat was approaching, which they feared was an Indian Navy ship. They left behind Ismail Khan’s satellite phone; it was recovered by Indian investigators and its photograph included in the dossier. A GPS, also recovered from the trawler suggests they kept a safe distance of at least 60 kilometers from Indian shore until they got closer to Mumbai.

The gunmen seemed to use Indian mobile phones during the course of the attacks. Their counselors, 6 in all, used Voice-Over-Internet-Protocol numbers, including one from an American company called “Callphonex.”

The telephone calls stop, inexplicably, about 24 hours into the attacks.

The last call transcript in the dossier is at 10:26 p.m. on Nov. 27, between a gunman inside Nariman House and his interlocutor. “Brother you have to fight,” says the caller. “This is a matter of the prestige of Islam.”

By the morning of Nov. 29, Indian forces had killed 9 of the fighters.

And then, there was one: the sole survivor, Mohammed Ajmal Kasab, is in the custody of the Mumbai police. His interrogation turned up the most frightening detail. He was part of a cadre of 32 would-be suicide bombers, that was later joined by an additional three men. A team of six went to Indian-administered Kashmir, Mr. Kasab told his interrogators.

Ten were kept in isolation for more than three months, in a house near Karachi, until they were instructed to go to Mumbai.

The dossier says nothing about what happened to the remaining trainees. Whether or where they will strike next remains a mystery.

Richard A. Oppel Jr. contributed reporting from Islamabad, Pakistan.